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Abstract 
In the beginning of the 21st century, models have emerged to describe and develop undergraduate 
research and inquiry-based learning. This article discusses four examples of modelling didactical 
issues around this topic. The aim of the first part is to scrutinize the epistemological and didactical 
purposes of these four models. As essential dimensions of undergraduate research and inquiry-
based learning are neglected, two alternative models are developed in the second part. The first of 
these puts the coordination of theory and evidence at the centre and determines three different 
horizons of significance in the field of science. In relation to these horizons, the second new model 
highlights the broader societal context of scientific practices. The role of research and science in 
society is recognized here, on the one hand as an affirmative process of institutionalization of 
approved knowledge, and on the other, as practices of criticizing and breaking away from 
established forms of knowing, testing, evaluating, and approving. Concomitantly, the education 
(‘Bildung’) of students through and within scientific practices of research and inquiry-based 
learning (Humboldt’s ‘Bildung durch Wissenschaft’) is interpreted against the backdrop of two 
opposing trajectories, which influence students’ ambitions to engage with problems of science. In 
relation to this, higher education didactics need to distinguish between long-term and short-term 
goals. It is argued that the latter concretizes the former. This understanding of teaching is 
corroborated against the backdrop of the concept of learning as ‘enculturation’ in science. The 
argumentation refers back to insights by Lev S. Vygotsky, Ludwik Fleck and Michael Polanyi. 
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Does higher education research and practice need models? The question may come as a 
surprise, as models are inseparable constituent parts of scientific and professional practice. 
In architecture, models serve as illustrations of building plans; economics employs them to 
reconstruct (and, if possible, also predict) complex economic developments, while physics 
uses models to explain specific laws, especially in those cases where observations are no 
longer feasible (for instance at an atomic level). More generally speaking, do models bring 
us closer to what is remote, utopian, or exists outside of our space of immediate sensual 
experience, and sometimes even outside of our imagination (like anti-matter)? Models are 
necessary for making relevant epistemic experiences. They structure and scaffold our 
perception and imagination. The materiality of models is often not (or not only) a 
miniature version of something too big to comprehend, or an enlargement of something 
too small to handle. Other models tend to become symbolic and abstract. The intention of 
modelling is often not to completely represent something real, but to discern what is 
essential from an epistemological point of view. Therefore, models often reduce 
complexity and turn to formalism. Models are thus never true or false (in a realistic sense), 
but powerful, or limited, or sometimes even unsuitable for the intended purpose (in a 
rationalistic or logical sense). Another criterion for models is substantiality or triviality (in 
a practical sense). These distinctions are ultimately relevant for (but not identical with) 
deontological reasoning, i.e. with arguments and reflections of what should be done. 
 
Against this backdrop, the use of models in higher education didactics for developing 
undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning shall be scrutinized. What is their 
power and what is the scope of their aims? Do they serve for illustration, reconstruction, 
or even for (causal) explanation of teaching and learning in university courses? In what 
follows, their epistemological context in research and teaching practice is explored. 
Moreover, their design is investigated for the ways it might help to guide and foster 
undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning (cf. Griffiths, 2004; Brew, 2013).  
 
The paper scrutinizes four models: one by Healey and Jenkins (Fig. 1), one by Levy and 
Petrulis (Fig. 2), one by Brew (Fig. 3) and one by Reinmann (Fig. 4). These examples are 
currently widely recognized by practitioners in higher education didactics and therefore 
seem to convey relevant insights. They are discussed in the first two sections with respect 
to their epistemological and practical purposes. It is found that although a practical 
purpose seems to exist, essential dimensions of undergraduate research and inquiry-based 
learning are ignored, which is indicative not only of theoretical problems but also of 
deficiencies in didactical practices. These deficiencies become obvious when abstractions 
about university teaching and learning made in the modelling are revealed. 
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Two new models are developed in the final sections. The first alternative model (fig. 5) 
puts the coordination of theory and evidence at the centre  and considers three different 
“horizons of significance” in undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning to 
theorize levels of students’ engagement. “Horizons of significance” are, according to 
Taylor, ethical and value-related dimensions of human practice (Taylor, 1991). Here, 
‘significance’ indicates that the person makes a stance clear and engages with aspects in 
the world while experiencing herself as significant and authentic against the background 
of “issues of importance” (p. 39). Taylor also highlights the intelligibility of feelings for 
this interrelation:  
 
Your feeling a certain way can never be sufficient grounds for respecting your position, 
because your feeling can’t determine what is significant. […] Things take on importance 
against a background of intelligibility. Let us call this a horizon. It follows that one of the 
things we can’t do, if we are to define ourselves significantly, is suppress or deny the horizons 
against which things take on significance for us. (p. 37) 
 
Horizons of significance can be interpreted in a similar way. Lev S. Vygotsky explained 
the concept of experience (perezhevanie) as a unity of emotional and intellectual self-
consciousness regarding an aspect of reality: 
There exists a dynamic meaningful system that constitutes a unity of affective and intellectual 
processes. Every idea contains some remnant of the individual’s affective relationship to that 
aspect of reality which it represents.  
Following Vygotsky, insights into personal experience or self-consciousness will 
methodologically depend on modelling the unity of affective and intellectual processes as 
concrete activity: 
In this way, analysis into units makes it possible to see the relationship between the individual’s 
needs or inclinations and his thinking. It also allows us to see the opposite relationship, the 
relationship that links his thoughts to the dynamics of behavior, to the concrete activity of the 
personality. (Vygotsky, 1987, pp. 50–51)	
With respect to this self-consciousness, this paper draws attention to how ethics and 
values in students’ undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning come into play 
while they discover significance in learning and in solving scientific problems.  
 
In that sense, the use of models implies a double meaning – one is (meta-)cognitive, and 
the other is ethical. A didactical model is (meta-)cognitive insofar as it may guide 
collaboration and interaction between teachers and students; and it is ethical as it may 
convey judgments about finding this way of doing it right or wrong. With this distinction, 
the use of models, whether didactical or scientific, simultaneously generates resonance in 
ways of thinking and feeling, which is why certain skills for research and inquiry are not 
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simply passed on from teachers to students, and not only appropriated by the students as 
‘learning content’.  
 
A guideline for this paper is therefore to see the acquisition of ethics and values as part of 
students’ learning and enculturation in science.  
 
In combination with the first new model (fig. 5), a second alternative didactical model 
(fig. 6) therefore highlights the broader societal context of research and teaching practices 
at universities, with their ethical and value-related horizons of significance. The role of 
research and scientific practices in society is recognized here, on the one hand as an 
affirmative process of institutionalization of approved scientific knowledge, and on the 
other, as a matter of criticizing and breaking away from established forms of knowing, 
testing, evaluating, and approving. Tensions, as they might revolve around affirmation 
versus critique, or more indirectly between values (or ethics) are assumed to be relevant 
for students’ learning and engagement.  
 
The analysis follows the insight that university teaching and learning in their concrete 
forms encompass, (1) the particular relationships of collaboration between teachers and 
learners, (2) the learners’ relationship with the scientific object of learning, and (3) the 
learners’ relationship to him-/herself while changing his/her perception, thought and 
competence throughout the learning process, thereby contributing to new horizons of 
significance (Langemeyer, 2006). These dimensions are acknowledged as parts of a 
whole, that is, they are only understandable as (inter-)related aspects and not as self-reliant 
elements. In what follows, the task is to question the four established models (figs. 1 to 4). 
This questioning is not exhaustive but rather exemplary for modelling higher education 
didactics, and aims to find solutions for overcoming simplifications or false abstractions.   
  
Describe or Explain? The Use of Modelling 
  
Polarizing Axes  
The first example of modelling is the model of undergraduate research and inquiry by 
Healey and Jenkins (2009), which is the most cited of the four examples. To understand its 
logic, its construction shall be explained. It polarizes along two orthogonal axes (fig. 1); 
on the one hand, between the active-participative vs. the more receptive roles of students 
and, on the other, between the research process vs. the research outcome as matters of 
learning. This model is based on earlier concepts by Griffiths (2004) which, according to 
reports by those authors, were developed as a sideline in a project about the relations of 
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research and teaching. Thus, the model displays different types of undergraduate research 
and inquiry in four sections.  
 
Fig. 1.: The nature of undergraduate research and inquiry, quoted from Healey and Jenkins 
(2009) 
 
Levy and Petrulis (2012) (fig. 2) modify Healey and Jenkins’ model and highlight further 
aspects of undergraduate research and inquiry. First, they take into account the difference 
between constructing knowledge from an individual or from a collective perspective. 
Their main concern is that knowledge can be new to the individual student but not 
necessarily new to the scientific community to which they start to belong (cf. Levy, 2009). 
This distinction is illuminated in the horizontal axis. The new model (fig. 2) therefore 
depicts four types of concrete learning actions – “producing, authoring, identifying, and 
pursuing”. The first two actions refer to inquiry for knowledge-building and discovery; 
this implies that new knowledge is built by students’ learning activities. Identifying and 
pursuing are types of inquiry for learning or exploring existing knowledge; this can be 
new to the individual learners only. Subsequently, Levy and Petrulis (2012) modified the 
model again to illuminate the differences between more and less support from the 
teachers.  
 
So far, the construction of these models (figs. 1 and 2) mainly operates with binary 
distinctions with regard to (a) the roles of students and teachers, (b) teaching activities, (c) 
learning activities, and (d) the epistemic relation to knowledge (old/new; individual/ 
collective gain of knowledge). But what dimensions do these models leave out, and in 
what ways is this relevant to their power to explain higher education didactics and bring 
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Fig. 2: Quoted from Healey and Jenkins (2009) based on Levy and Petrulis (2007, p. 3) 
 
 
The opposites symbolized by the axes abstract from many of the concrete phenomena in 
the many facets of teaching and learning in science. As explained in the introduction, this 
is not problematic as such. The question is whether relevant issues are ignored such that 
particular insights or imaginations for higher education didactics are impaired. To 
discover aspects not recognized in the models and their implications, one has to look for 
the abstractions which have been made: Which concrete dimensions of teaching and 
learning are no longer addressed and no longer visible?  
 
Facets neglected include, those about the concrete learning activities when students 
engage with research and inquiry: (1) Is the relationship between the teacher and the 
learners really a collaborative and insightful one – if yes, in what ways when, and why is 
there perhaps a lack of collaboration and understanding? To explain this lack, the second 
dimension, the learning matter, is important: (2) What are the main characteristics of the 
research object and how complex is it? Is it accessible by concrete-sensual experiences 
such as a stone falling into the water or people’s conversation? Is it a phenomenon with a 
distinct shape (like a table) and with a clear beginning and end (e.g. a course in 
Geography)? In other words, can the phenomenon be observed completely by a 
researcher’s/learner’s sensual perception in a particular situation? And, if not, how does 
this affect the teaching-learning-situation? Given that the subject of teaching is mainly a 
theoretical object such as ‘society’ or ‘identity’, which scientists think of as existing in 
reality but without evident boundaries, how can teaching support students to make 
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All these questions are salient with respect to the third dimension, the relationship of 
learners towards themselves: (3) Is (and in what ways) the learning challenge related to 
the comprehension of scientific theories and research? Is it necessary for the learner to 
discover a particular “horizon of significance” (Taylor, 1991) as relevant for him-/herself? 
Learning in science as well as research practices requires capacities of (precise) 
perceiving, skimming, measuring, interpreting, questioning, evaluating etc. All of this is 
not devoid of ethical and value-related dimensions. ‘Doing science’ is therefore both 
(meta-)cognitive and ethical. Students’ experience in undergraduate research and inquiry-
based learning needs recognition in these terms. In what ways do they feel challenged, or 
even overstrained as newcomers, since they are not used to radically questioning familiar 
beliefs?  
 
The students’ “horizons of significance” as they develop in a particular scientific domain 
are often neglected didactically, or at least considered as subordinate to the “content” or 
the “subject matter”. However, teachers’ awareness of students’ worldviews and of their 
emotional-intellectual way of experiencing is essential to acting purposefully and 
meaningfully in educational practices. If students, for example, are to acquire an 
understanding of why propositions like ‘Modern society is yellow’ or ‘Mary’s identity is 
bigger than Paul’s’ are scientifically nonsense, they are dealing with a particular horizon 
of scientific thinking. Understanding the quality of judgments, their particular relevance, 
and what is sense or nonsense is often unclear to students (and probably not as self-evident 
as in these examples). To understand them, students would need to make experiences in 
their respective fields, using concepts and their logic in theory.  
 
Concomitantly, they would need to learn not only the definition of concepts like “society”, 
“identity” or “evolution”, but also their significance and their epistemological status 
within scientific reasoning. Their learning would also have to be about transforming and 
developing their worldview (cf. Vianna, Hougaard & Stetsenko, 2014) as a reflected and 
coherent framework, in which e.g. they cannot deny that the “evolution of species” 
occurred simply because no one has ever directly experienced the process of evolution. 
Capacities of scientific reasoning require a certain type of experience concerning the 
history and genesis of scientific concepts, methods and beliefs, and thus scientific 
reasoning develops with the consciousness of different epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina & 
Reichmann, 2015). As a rule, capacities of scientific reasoning also build on contradicting 
everyday-life experience. For example, “matter” in the physics of Einstein is not the same 
as what a child thinks about it. This implies that learning in the context of research occurs 
also as a rupture with regard to common sense beliefs and paradigms (cf. Bachelard, 
1984). Didactically, all of this needs to be recognized as core features of undergraduate 
research and inquiry-based learning.  
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Yet these considerations are not indicated by the binary construction of axes in the models 
discussed (figs. 1 and 2). If a model for undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning 
were to create a basis for a reflection of this issue, it would need to incorporate insights 
from the philosophy of science and relate these to apparent features of activities within 
undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning. However, the models provided by 
Healey and Jenkins, and Levy and Petrulis, with their polarizing axes, show some deficits 
in this respect. Research processes cannot be conducted without reflecting upon the 
available stores of knowledge. But both models’ polarizing axes separate these aspects. 
And vice versa, research findings cannot be interpreted without any reference to the 
research process. Similarly, reception does not exclude active participation in research or, 
conversely, active participation in research does not exclude receptive learning. The two 
models presented primarily satisfy the need for a systematic approach to formats of 
teaching and learning practices rather than explaining or developing them. 
 
To corroborate this argument, further problems consist in the fact that university teachers 
are not provided with  a framework to decide how and when scientific research can be 
turned over to in- or less experienced students, or to reflect about didactics raising, e.g., 
the sense of responsibility for critical thinking, and students’ aspirations to independent 
scientific research at a methodical, theoretical and philosophical level. In addition, 
teaching/education in a research- and inquiry-based manner implies more than just 
reflecting these decisions or answers. Teaching is ultimately an interaction with concrete 
students conducted through in situ relationships of collaboration.  
 
Another important argument here is that the two models using polarizing axes (fig. 1 and 
2) do not make a clear distinction between teaching and learning activities. We do not 
know whether the models illustrate the students as they are seen by the teacher as an 
observer rather than an active participant, or whether they represent students genuinely 
complying with one or the other role. One might argue that these models idealize the 
effects of social interaction, and that if teachers address students as an audience, then they 
will act as alert listeners. But why is it then that students do not always comply with the 
roles teachers allocate to them? These models could help to explore and explain these 
issues. But given the polarizing axes, neither of the models meet this claim, because they 
do not deal with events that would be hidden, or at least not directly observable. To sum 
up, the general problem seems to lie in the construction of polarizing axes and the 
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There are several different issues with regard to the model introduced by Brew (fig. 3). 
Brew (2013) criticizes the model by Healey and Jenkins as well as its advancement and 
modification by Levy and Petrulis. Brew’s critique is similar to mine in the previous 
section, although she acknowledges the practicability of the models: 
It is clear that these frameworks are helpful for academics in thinking through aspects of 
research and/or inquiry-based learning, but they have some limitations. For example, it is 
difficult to see how students can be developing research and inquiry skills when they are an 
audience for research as suggested by the Healey and Jenkins model. Further, in that model, 
there is no space given to where students are engaging in debates about the history, sociology 
and philosophy of research. The Levy and Petrulis model lacks clarity, for example, about what 
is meant by ‘more support’ and ‘less support’. (Brew, 2013, p. 608) 
In her own model, Brew (2013) turns to circles and divisions similar to a ‘wheel’, instead 
of polarizing axes, and pays attention to decision responsibilities, e.g. whether teachers or 
students choose a topic, or whether they negotiate this, and whether the student or teacher 
is responsible for assessing the outcome. Brew’s model should thus help to understand the 
‘complex decision’-making in higher education on ‘different levels’ (Brew 2013, pp. 604-
5). In particular, Brew distinguishes between ‘curricular and pedagogical decisions’ (p. 
606), and argues that from ‘a curriculum perspective, […] questions arise about the overall 
structure of the course’ (p. 608), whereas ‘from a pedagogical point of view’, ‘questions 
arise about […] the integration of the different elements’ of the relationship between 
teachers and students (ibid.).  
 
From the pedagogical perspective, Brew emphasises a ‘student-centred way of thinking’ 
(p. 609), and independent of this, from the institutional perspective she stresses ‘that 
universities should progressively become scholarly knowledge-building communities 
where academics and students work together to learn and to solve problems of the world’ 
(ibid.). Against this backdrop, she discerns the challenge to understand the ‘complex 
interaction between curricular intentions and research intentions’ (p. 610). Thus, Brew’s 
model (fig. 3) is meant as a holistic conception of a student-centred form of higher 
education where different ‘levels of autonomy’ as well as different ‘aspects of inquiry’ can 
systematically be reflected in their dynamics (p. 614). 
 
Brew’s intention to support teachers’ thorough reflection on the students’ and the 
institution’s perspectives, corresponds with the presentation of many more facets of the 
teaching-learning process compared to Healey and Jenkins’ or Levy and Petrulis’ models 
with their polarizing axes. However, if we look closely, the possible dynamics of learning 
processes are not explained or depicted here. Brew’s model also abstracts from concrete 
issues of experiencing. 
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Fig. 3. A holistic Model for Research-based Learning Decision-Making, Brew (2013, p. 
613) 
 
The change from learning through a structured task to learning with an unstructured task, 
for example, is likely to result in uncertainty as it shifts the learning to a higher level. This 
could (unfavourably) be seen as trivial in the sense that it is merely a teacher’s decision to 
either embrace uncertainty or to mitigate it by scaffolding activities and the like. The 
triviality of this decision-making could be overcome by reflecting on the consequences for 
both teachers and students. However, Brew leaves this unclear.  
 
Another example of modelling university teaching for undergraduate research and inquiry-
based learning in a holistic way is by Reinmann (2016) (fig. 4). Her wheel-figure 
highlights three types of learning activities: (i) ‘Learning about research’ means that the 
relationship of the student towards research matters requires reception, to become 
informed, to listen, to watch or to read about scientific inquiry; (ii) ‘Learning through 
research’ is the relationship of the student towards research matters, which implies 
production and exploration, i.e. to discover something, to find a research question, to try to 
answer it with scientific means and methods etc.; and (iii) finally, ‘learning for research’ 
stands for the relationship of the student towards research matters, which mediates 
between the first two.  
progressively through discussion with colleagues and trialled and evaluated in a variety of
academic development workshops.
This circular or ‘wheel’ model integrates decisions about the curriculum context
including the nature, number and type of students, learning outcomes including disci-
plinary knowledge acquisition and attributes, capabilities and skills to be developed as well
as, the nature of knowledge and the nature of the tasks to be completed and how they are to
be assessed.
Students
The model places students in the centre. They are indeed its central focus. Their back-
grounds and level of study (e.g. high achieving students or students of all abilities; first,
second, third year etc.), as well as how many of them there are to be accommodated form
the context for the initia ive and need to be taken into account, and, n fact drive any
curriculum decision-m king. Students c n be engaged in research and inquiry rig t from
the start of their degree. Some research may only be possible with large numbers of
students and some may only be possible with small groups or individuals. These are
contextual factors that critically influence curricular and pedagogical decision-making.
Context
Working out from the centre of the circle the unshaded area highlights the context. This
includes the institutional and departmental contexts, and the teaching and learning and
Fig. 3 A wholistic model for Research-based learning decision-making
High Educ (2013) 66:603–618 613
123
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Therefore this learning is about methods and metacognitions which are not necessarily 




Fig. 4: Model for Academic Teaching, Reinmann, 2016, p. 236 (my translation) 
 
For Reinmann, all three forms of learning are interdependent in university teaching and 
cannot exist without one other. Given Reinmann’s divisions, the model (fig. 4) shows that 
didactical planning needs to consider three different spaces of learning: (i) an ‘information 
space’, (ii) an ‘exploration space’, and (iii) a ‘testing space’. In all these spaces teaching 
fulfils the tasks of instruction (knowledge transmission), and guiding or supporting as well 
as activating students, however the focus on these tasks varies: Learning about research 
mainly refers to instruction, learning through research refers to guidance or support, and 
learning for research refers to activation. Yet, questions like ‘How and when should 
teachers proceed from one didactical setting to another?’, or ‘Is it important to provide an 
exhaustive information space before exploring a particular matter?’ have no guidance 
through the model.  
 
To compare the models presented in this section: New aspects raised by Brew are student 
autonomy and the openness of the research process, which university teachers should take 
into account. Her model also tries to address the many facets of teachers’ decisions about 
the learning process in a manner that should support student-centred forms of learning. It 
is for this purpose that she presents a wheel figure (fig. 3) instead of polarizing axes, and 
promotes a holistic view. Reinmann’s model (fig. 4) preserves this holistic view but 
reduces the variety of aspects to three facets. These facets are presented in a more 
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away from a strong commitment to student-centred forms of teaching towards indicating 
that more traditional forms of teaching are also meaningful if they are realized in an 
interrelated manner. Overall, according to Reinmann, the purpose of academic teaching 
should be subordinated to the ideal of empowering students for scientific reasoning and 
research.  
 
However, neglected aspects remain with regard to (1) the relationship between teachers 
and learners: What kind of relation is necessary and why? In what ways is it sound to shift 
from instruction to guidance and from here to activation? And since these qualities are not 
exhaustive, how do they interact with e.g. fear, resistance or critique? Teachers’ feedback 
to students’ particular engagement with scientific problems is undeniably relevant for (2) 
the individual learner’s relation to the subject matter. The two wheel models, however, do 
not display this dimension sufficiently. If teachers look for guidance in reflecting their 
feedback to students, they will find hardly any support in these four models (figs. 1 to 4). 
None of them depicts how students’ horizons of significance (their meaningful self-
relation (3) shift as they are influenced by learning, nor considers how learners might be 
blocked or hindered by themselves from achieving a scientific and relevant goal. 
Long-term and Short-term Goals in Didactics 
In what follows, two new, alternative models for university teaching are introduced to 
develop an epistemologically and ethically deepened understanding of the scientific 
practices to which undergraduate research and inquiry belong. The first model (fig. 5), the 
coordination model, captures three levels of research practice and experience 
conceptualized as the coordination of theory and evidence. Its perspective is 
simultaneously one of a student-learner as well as a researcher-learner, but not the 
university teacher. In the second model (fig. 6), the enculturation model, university 
teaching is addressed from the standpoint of the teacher-subject by means of long-term 
and short-term goals, insofar as university teachers evaluate their actions not only in the 
light of a concrete situation in lectures or seminars and their immediate outcomes, but also 
as an ethical intervention into students’ life-worlds and worldviews, with long-term 
consequences. In this sense, the enculturation process of students is addressed. 
 
Enculturation is often understood as an adaptation to or assimilation by a given culture. In 
science, this can be the epistemic culture of a certain discipline (Knorr Cetina & 
Reichmann, 2015). The community-of-practice-research relates enculturation also to 
changes of identity, proficiency and expertise, and interprets research-driven learning as a 
form of apprenticeship (cf. Feldman et al., 2013). In what follows, the argument goes 
further, to see theoretical experience, knowledge acquisition, and scientific discovery itself 
as deeply rooted in processes of enculturation.  
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The coordination of theory and evidence is considered as the essence of research-related 
proficiency and thus of research-driven learning. It is determined, according to Deanna 
Kuhn, as the core competence of scientists: 
The scientist (a) is able to consciously articulate a theory that he or she accepts, (b) knows what 
evidence does and could support it and what evidence does or would contradict it, and (c) is 
able to justify why the coordination of available theories and evidence has led him or her to 
accept that theory and reject others purporting to account for the same phenomena. Although 
they do not encompass all aspects of scientific thinking, these skills in coordinating theories 
and evidence arguably are the most central, essential, and general skills that define scientific 
thinking. (Deanna Kuhn, 1989, p. 674) 
This definition is relevant to acknowledge not only skills, but the entire change in 
students’ internal behaviour, including their worldviews and fundamental ethical and 
epistemic beliefs. In what follows, this will be addressed as an important aspect of the 
scientification of intellectual behaviour on an individual level (Langemeyer, 2015a, 
2015b). ‘Scientification’ describes the quality of the production of knowledge, both 
individually as well as societally, as it contributes to more and more exact, valid, profound 
and relevant forms of knowledge. The university plays an important role in the long-term 
societal process of scientification, which changes the mode of production and the entire 
societal exchange. Thus, scientification is (a) a material process to institutionalize certain 
scientific practices, affirming certain pieces of approved knowledge as achievements 
towards objective truth, certainty, and a common acknowledgement of expectations. In 
sum, this means that these stores of knowledge become societally relevant, and usable for 
different purposes. Institutionalizing scientific results is not only important within the 
societal organization to further scientific research. It also contributes to stability and 
efficacy in society, to the development of forces of production, and reciprocally to the 
reputation of scientific institutions, titles, proficiency and expertise. In other words, this 
institutionalization is simultaneously about forming societal practice through scientific 
expertise and about building up prestige for science as such. Therefore, the process of 
institutionalization can be recognized as a contribution to a field of power structures in 
society. These power structures are not necessarily scientific themselves, but they support 
the relevance of universities as well as research institutions. Scientists who belong to this 
power structure participate in organizing the disposal of resources as well as opportunities 
to influence people’s opinions and the formation of their worldviews.  
 
However, the process of scientification must be understood also as (b) a process of radical 
doubting and criticizing, and thus even as an effort to break away from established forms 
of scientific societal practice, technologies, ethics, worldviews, and paradigms, and of 
reorganizing science and the field of power structures (Langemeyer, 2015a, ch. 4; 
Langemeyer, 2017). These two counter-movements can be depicted as levels of reflection 
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and critique, along with a reworking of the particular theories, methods and hypotheses. 
The coordination model (fig. 5) highlights a number of situations of decision-making in 
research and inquiry: Similarly to professional researchers, students may be confronted at 
first with some obvious mismatches between the theory (displayed by their research 
question or hypotheses) and the data or research material provided. This can be a starting 
point for further research-related activities and decisions: Students may start to test in 
what ways the data is insufficient or irrelevant to the question of evidence, and these 
activities may guide their reflections. In addition, they may explore how better data can be 
collected, and so they need to anticipate new possibilities for relevant insights. Next, again 
similarly to researchers, students might move on to criticize the quality of either the 
hypotheses or the data (which often requires reflection of broad knowledge), or the way 
they are related to each other. Thus, they start to collect new data and/or modify the 
theory. Depending on the intensity of inquiry, this research may lead to philosophical 
reflections on the paradigm to which the theory belongs. Concomitantly, students need to 
anticipate how a paradigm shift could open up new possibilities to coordinate theory and 
evidence with respect to a certain research problem. Theoretical experience with the limits 
and shortcomings of a system of thought and belief, or of a ‘thinking style’ (which will be 
explained later), thus become paramount. 
 
The two sides of the scientification process as both critique and affirmative institutiona-
lization, have great influence on the spaces of experiencing for both researchers/teachers 
and students/learners. The process of criticizing and breaking away determines an 
experience of disconformity. Consequently, this space (or horizon of significance) is more 
likely characterized by insecurity, uncertainty, isolation and a lack of recognition and 
support. 
 
In contradistinction, the process of establishing a scientific discipline, paradigm or 
scientific approach usually determines a space of experience of conformity with a centre 
of power, with plenty of possibilities to attain certainty, security, membership and 
recognition. The role model here implies respect of authorities, and acceptance of a given 
order. 
 
For both teachers and students, the two dimensions of scientification are linked to 
different forms of existence, i.e. different ways of life and different models of being an 
intellectual in society. Although the trajectories of these roles point in opposite directions, 
I assume that in universities, scientists and teachers as well as students are challenged to 
compromise and balance between them. All of this influences teachers’ and students’ 
aspirations to engage with science (a particular scientific discipline) in general, as well as 
with concrete situations and tasks of research and inquiry. 
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Fig. 5: Three Levels of Experience Gained in Research and Inquiry-Based Learning 
through the Coordination of Theory and Evidence. 
 
 
Against this backdrop, I return to the idea of distinguishing between the short-term and 
long-term goals of teaching – referring to the enculturation model (fig. 6). Short-term 
goals can change in a teaching situation, although the long-term goal may remain in place; 
every short-term goal lends a more concrete shape to the long-term goal. The analytical 
assessment thus involves reflections of students’ level of research experience and 
competence, the level of universities’ curricula and research programs as institutions, as 
well as the level of sciences and universities as life-worlds as particular material forms of 
existence. By distinguishing these levels, it is possible to reconsider the horizon of 
significance as to how and why students engage with research and inquiry. In particular, it 
is possible to reflect how they are or become involved with the two aspects of 
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Teaching and learning are thus not only interactions which are often initiated or guided by 
the teacher in relation to particular students. Intentionally or not, teachers serve as role 
models with which students identify, or sometimes disidentify, thus embracing or rejecting 
different ways of life and different worldviews. Experiences of this kind are constitutive 
on an inter- and intrapersonal level. At the same time, the three levels of experience in 
research and inquiry (fig. 5) become relevant to the students, for they ask themselves why 
it is important to get involved in certain research problems rather than others. Students are 
always on the look out to find authenticity and significance for themselves in the broader 
context of science as a societal dimension, and its societal functions as an epistemic but 
also a world-changing practice, as an institution with authority and prestige, as a 
legitimation and prerequisite to obtain certain positions and occupancies, and to exercise 
certain competences in society. Teachers should become aware of these horizons of 
significance as students perceive them, and therefore they need to reflect on their teaching 
activities in the light of long-term goals (fig. 6). 
 
Thus, for undergraduate research and inquiry, in pursuing his or her long-term goal the 
teacher tries to achieve a process of enculturation of students. The choice between modes 
of learning is determined by contextual circumstances and constraints, but is not as 
essential as the idea of the enculturation process. Beyond identification with its goals and 
institutional roles, this encompasses familiarization with the different nature of scientific 
types of thinking, dissemination of a specific scientific ethos, and strictness of a specific 
discipline. Other explanations follow below.  
 
It is important at this point to emphasize that the teacher’s short-term goals under the 
long-term goal of “enculturation” may vary, as they are put into concrete terms under 
different premises, which may change. Structural patterns of teaching do not correspond to 
a mere either-or decision between recipient and active (in the role of students), and result 
vs. process (for the objective of learning), respectively. Teaching and learning always 
exist in a dynamic situation in which the relations of long-term and short-term goals need 
to be analysed as either harmonic or dissonant, depending on the horizons of significance 
of the whole scientific field. Figure 6 therefore illuminates trajectories of the personal 
relationships between teachers and learners in science.  
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Fig. 6: Enculturation in Science through Undergraduate Research and Inquiry as a Long-
Term Goal 
 
Enculturation as a Leading Principle 
 
The concept of “enculturation” in my theoretical framework stems from several sources. It 
is based in gestalt psychology and its reception by the philosopher Michael Polanyi, and 
then on the biologist and science theoretician Ludwik Fleck and thirdly, in the psychology 
of Lev S. Vygotsky. Their frameworks intersect in many ways, but these authors did not 
work in a common socio-historical context.  
 
The assumption of a long-term goal called “enculturation” is imperative because research 
processes are open (at least in part) to something problematic, something unforeseeable, 
which has not yet been recognized or happens at random (cf. Langemeyer, 2015a, ch. 4). 
Therefore, teaching needs to arouse in the mind of the learner an attitude of querying and 
investigating (Huber 2009, p. 9). Developing expertise in science is a prolonged process of 
involvement and self-education, which cannot ever be completed. But each time it poses 
anew the challenge to pursue goals authentic to oneself. In this sense, it is assumed that 
teaching undergraduate research and inquiry serves to demonstrate different ways of being 
an expert researcher to students. Simultaneously, undergraduate research and inquiry-
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based learning allows students to solve problems in a more or less independent way, and 
thereby deepen their knowledge and understanding of a scientific area. In this way, 
subjectively meaningful relations between teachers and students may emerge and may also 
establish significant relations between individual learning and the processes of 
scientification.  
 
Consequently, individual learning moves up to ‘higher levels’ in the sense that it gets 
closer to the general questions of science. Students are thus also meant to experience 
science itself as a horizon of significance. In a participatory way, university teachers may 
therefore demonstrate scientific approaches only as possible modes of thinking, and 
illustrate the differences between one way of producing a theory and others. The 
demonstration of specific and exemplary problem solutions is supposed to make students 
capable of deciding between one methodological approach and others, and to actively 
handle research issues through joint discussions. The long-term goal of “enculturation” in 
this way accompanies a systematic and didactic treatment of the subject matter. The long-
term goal does not disappear in this way, nor does it compete, but it is interwoven into the 
intentions of short-term goals. Research-driven teaching in this way encompasses several 
short-term goals pursued partly simultaneously. However, there is one guiding principle in 
which students are to be advanced beyond a given thinking horizon to allow them to 
transcend what they previously recognized and understood, and continue to think 
independently with regard to general problems.  
 
The horizon opened up by teaching undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning 
depends on the discipline involved and how the compromise between the two sides of 
scientification can be resolved. The broadening of the cognitive horizon does not 
necessarily (and probably only rarely) coincide with the objective that after a session of 
undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning, students will obtain the competence of 
researching (cf. Langemeyer, 2013; 2015a). Instead, this capacity requires taking a stance 
towards both scientification as affirmative institutionalization, as well as critique. 
Consequently, the imagination and anticipation involved in science is also especially 
established when working on scientifically unsolved problems.  
Theoretical Foundations of the Enculturation Concept 
	
These assumptions will be underlined further below, with Polanyi, Fleck, and Vygotsky. 
These authors were strongly influenced by gestalt psychology, whose holistic core concept 
implies that objects of perception are entities meaning more than the sum of their parts.  
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In what follows, enculturation refers to the entirety of psychic activity involved in 
perceiving, thinking, reasoning, imagining and learning, as it connects the individual to 
the societal horizons of significance. In these processes, as gestalt psychology conveys, 
elements are arranged as a shape (or gestalt) when they are moved into the foreground 
together, thus making their self-reliant elements part of the background. Recognizing a 
face, for instance, means making its elements (mainly the eyes, nose and mouth) become 
an entity. The face as a whole is seen “through” these elements. Polanyi uses the term 
‘subsidiary,’ i.e. a provisional awareness for what remains recognizable in the 
background, as something on which one relies in order to comprehend.  
Being aware of something in a subsidiary way means that we do not realize it in itself but as a 
point of reference or tool pointing beyond itself. (Polanyi, 1959, p. 44, as quoted in Neuweg 
1999, p. 189). 
In research, the same principle can be found: ‘To diagnose a disease,’ for example, ‘is to 
grasp the joint meaning of its symptoms, many of which we could not specify; so we 
know these particulars only by relying on them as clues.’ (Polanyi 1961; p. 243). Like this 
form of knowing, researching also implies accepting uncertainties:  
Many of the clues of perception cannot be known in themselves at all; others can be traced only 
by acute scientific analysis; but all of them can serve the purpose of seeing what is in front of 
us only if we make no attempt at looking at them or attend to them in themselves. They must be 
left to abide in the role of unspecifiable particulars of the spectacle perceived by our eyes if we 
are to see anything at all. (Ibid., p. 242) 
Thinking (and not only for scientific inquiry) implies in principle a movement from a 
proximal to a distal term (cf. ibid. Polanyi 1985, p. 19). In mental action the integration 
between the proximal and the distal terms is experienced both actively and passively. ‘On 
the one hand, it is caused but, on the other hand, it is actively experienced by the subject’ 
(Neuweg 1999, p. 206), as can be explained by the example of a scientific discovery: ‘We 
make it, and yet it surprises us’ (ibid.). This, being the actor of that integration and 
simultaneously the recipient of its results, also makes up the character, sometimes difficult 
to grasp, of learning and research processes. Nevertheless, it is useful to pay attention to 
this. Discovery often arouses enthusiasm and motivation in the person engaged with 
learning and researching. And in science, the nature of this experience is often 
simultaneously a transgression of individual limits. Therefore, the socio-cultural 
dimension of activities like thinking, perceiving, researching, diagnosing etc. needs to be 
explained.  
 
Referring to Fleck, certain forms of perception or thinking are organized and cultivated in 
collectives such as scientific communities. When developing (or advancing) theories, 
these communities contain cultural powers to reinforce certain thinking styles. In addition, 
I suggest that they provide a ‘horizon of significance’. However, communities are also 
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powerful when it comes to a critique and dissolution of specific systems of perception in 
order to deliberately establish a changed relation of elements with regard to a new gestalt. 
This new relation can be guided by a specific new theoretical organization of seeing and 
thinking. As everyday theories lend structure to perceptions, mostly unknown to people in 
their everyday lives, students must first of all learn how to reflect on the premises of their 
thinking. However, any re-organization of thinking guided by scientific principles builds 
on theoretical experiences from earlier generations and scientific communities constituting 
a certain paradigm. The difficulty of questioning and changing forms of perception is 
exemplified in Vygotsky’s comment on the findings about the rotation of the earth about 
the sun, and the vision of ants:  
How much critical work on our perceptions and, thus, on the concepts linked with them, how 
much direct study of these concepts—visibility, invisibility, apparent movement—how much 
creation of new concepts, of new links between concepts, how much modifications of the very 
concepts of vision, light, movement etc. was needed to establish these facts! (Vygotsky, 1997, 
p. 251). 
Similarly, Fleck argues that the specific paradigm of scientific theories questioning 
concepts and types of perception is not only a learning process for an atomized individual. 
It must be seen within the horizon of worldviews that are passed on, not only by scientific 
communities but also by other communities in society. As different worldviews compete 
with one other, scientific critique remains essential, and plays an important role in the 
enculturation process of students. Otherwise, they would miss what Vygotsky explains as 
the essence of science:  
After all, if concepts, as tools, were set aside for particular facts of experience in advance, all 
science would be superfluous; then a thousand administrator-registrators or statistician-counters 
could not down the universe on cards, graphs, columns. Scientific knowledge differs from the 
registration of a fact in that it selects the concept needed, i.e., it analyses both fact and concept. 
(Ibid.) 
The process of developing a fact is seen by Fleck as an outcome of the work of thinking 
collectives. For only groups would be able to muster the energy to transform the 
unorganized elements of all real relations into an ordered system of knowledge (Thomas 
S. Kuhn calls this the generation of a paradigm, cf. Babich, 2003). Fleck underlines the 
power in this collective work in the following image: 
Interposed between the subject and the object is a third element, community. It is creative like 
the subject, stubborn like the object, and dangerous like an elementary force. (Fleck 2001 
[1960], p. 470). 
The cultural framework within which “facts” are seen and interpreted arises historically in 
relation to the common way of life and constitutes the background to the way of inquiring 
and investigating. It determines, for instance, the ‘mood of the scientist’ which decides 
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‘whether the new gestalt appeared to him as a symbolic bright vision or as a weak 
prospect of opposition slowing down the free, almost arbitrary choice among the 
alternating images’ (Fleck 2011 [1935], p. 232).  
 
This confronts researchers and students in science with the challenge of giving up many 
types of everyday thinking which they have learned culturally in their milieu. They need 
to undergo a different enculturation process in order to be able to understand the many 
scientific experiences of earlier generations and scientific communities.  
 
Fleck’s approach and his use of the concept of collective styles of thinking shows what 
happens when people want to conduct scientific research but were not encultured in a 
specific discipline and its patterns of thought and perception. The insight into this 
necessity arises from the foundation of activities observed specifically in several 
bacteriological laboratories. To Fleck one experience turned out to be decisive.  
 
When Fleck (2011 [1945], pp. 492-3; 2011 [1948], pp. 538-40) came as a prisoner to the 
Buchenwald concentration camp in 1943 he was to work there as a specialist in vaccines 
against epidemic typhus. Indirectly, he contributed to a useless vaccine being delivered to 
SS soldiers (ibid.). The background to the production of an ineffective vaccine can be used 
to explain the importance of enculturation. A group of prisoners had been charged with 
developing the vaccine. Fleck recognized the uselessness of the vaccine they produced, 
but kept this finding to himself to protect the group from the violence of the SS. For nearly 
two years, Fleck thus had the possibility to ‘observe the scientific efforts of a group made 
up exclusively of laymen’ (1983 [1935], pp. 135-6). The group was commissioned to 
solve complicated problems in the field of epidemic typhus, with fully equipped 
laboratories, laboratory animals, and a library of literature for their work. However, the 
head of the group, who was a physician but a layman in bacteriology, merely supplied 
materials and drove people on to work. One key problem was to study whether epidemic 
typhus pathogens (Rickettsia prowazekii) in the lungs of mice and rabbits infected through 
the nose could be found by a certain method. As the staff had never seen Rickettsia and 
were not familiar with the usual bacteriological flora of the lungs and bronchi, nor with 
the cellular elements of these organs, they had to use, ‘descriptions and illustrations to 
learn to see these elementary things, i.e. somehow go the opposite way relative to normal 
processes of detection.’ (Ibid.) As a consequence the group, ‘exactly in correspondence 
with the rules in the books’ and ‘with high accuracy,’ had found ‘all stages of the 
development cycle of Rickettsia and their required sequence’ although ‘they did not really 
have these pathogens in their material at that time.’ (Ibid.) ‘The motor of this imaginary 
synthesis,’ according to Fleck, was ‘mutual reinforcement,’ the ‘build-up of a high level of 
expectancy to see specific effects,’ the ‘desire to be appreciated,’ ‘competition,’ and the 
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‘wish to satisfy their head, who badly wanted to see results’. Fleck comments on this 
situation (ibid.):  
The elements of the mood in principle were identical to those normally encountered. I observed 
such a situation – the birth of discovery.  
What was ‘discovered’ by these lay researchers, according to Fleck, were eosin granules 
originating from the leucocytes of rabbits; the group believed, however, that they had just 
found the Rickettsia for which they had been looking.  
Then the entire cycle grew step by step. Things that did not agree were ascribed to permissible 
discrepancies among opinions in the field. […] The unavoidable “biological inaccuracy” 
became the guiding principle invented by the doctor of law and philosophy mentioned in the 
list of members of the group, who was the highest critical authority in the group. (Ibid.) 
Against this backdrop, Fleck concludes that ‘the social mechanism of the generation of a 
mistake [was] identical to the mechanism of generation of true knowledge’ (Fleck, 1983 
[1946], p. 140). 
 
Fleck’s enculturation concept allows us to show several central aspects of learning 
processes in undergraduate research and inquiry. It becomes obvious that a scientific 
course of studies in one discipline means more than just knowledge of scientific and 
technical literature and access to research equipment and methods. In particular, the 
indispensable process of independently experiencing research, inquiry and the 
requirements to be met in scientific aspects will fail in the absence of the need to have 
been part of a thinking collective. Only participation in scientific groups and their work 
allows them to make meaningful and adequate uses of the possibilities of thinking and 
action available. Only against the background of being a participant of a thinking 
collective can both the continuation of a particular scientific approach and its critique and 
correction become possible. 
 
At best, the enculturation process gives rise to important experiences in a particular 
reference system of a discipline through theoretical interpretation of research issues or 
‘facts.’ As in Polanyi’s concept of background knowledge, participation in a collective 
style of thinking leads to empirical experience and theoretical insight being arranged in a 
specific way. The concept determines how something can become an object of research, 
which objects can or must be objects of empirical research, and which ones are not 
eligible. For instance, up until the 16th century people: 
[...] had been able to find bones close to graveyards and study them, but the Middle Ages 
simply had no intellectual need for such observations; when it looked at a bone, it was able to 
see only what could be found also in books without any need to look (Fleck, 2011 [1935], p. 
229).  
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The enculturation process is therefore more than just an experience by which newcomers 
are adapted to a given culture. It also includes active participation in and engagements 
with a community’s practices and beliefs. In scientific research practices, this encloses the 
tensions of scientification as both affirmative institutionalizations and critique. 
What Is the Consequence? 
Against the backdrop of the concept of enculturation, undergraduate research and inquiry-
based learning implies both involvement and a change in being. Students’ involvement in 
the scientific field means understanding historically why former generations learnt to see 
the world differently, to reflect on one’s own worldviews, and to learn to engage oneself 
in scientific problems of contemporary relevance. Furthermore, it means that students 
become aware of discrepancies between their personal experience and the experience 
made on the basis of scientific methods, concepts, and theories (cf. Hinchliffe, 2011). 
They start to develop a deeper knowledge of the reasons why a given set of data fits or 
does not fit with the evidence, and why they sometimes need to collect new data with a 
different quality, or to modify or change their theoretical point of view. Sometimes this 
even includes a critique of the paradigm in which the theory can be considered as 
plausible and relevant. 
 
As has been shown, the “enculturation” concept is relevant for a profound understand of 
didactics for undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning. It becomes evident as a 
concretization of this process through personal relationships with teachers and their 
teaching, according to short-term goals (and not goals as such). Comprehending the 
process exceeds the need for a systematic classification of types of teaching format or 
modes of interaction as we perceive or observe them immediately. This is what the four 
models discussed in the first parts of this paper neglect. The key question for teachers, i.e. 
what currently is most important to students, is ultimately to be decided in the light of 
contextual circumstances, and the two aspects of the scientification process as affirmative 
institutionalization and critique in the field of a particular discipline or practice. 
Didactically, undergraduate research and inquiry-based learning can only be developed 
through orientation by the long-term goal of “enculturation”, because it implies becoming 
an expert researcher-subject within a research field – although this development may only 
be partially realized by students.  
 
Nevertheless, in the absence of this long-term perspective to advance (certain) research 
fields in an affirmative but also  a critical way, undergraduate research and inquiry-based 
learning would have to be declared impossible. Given the limits of short-term goals, 
students would not become aware of their responsibility, and thus teaching would fail to 
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contribute to the development of research capacities with regard to unsolved societal 
issues and competences for building new futures.  
 
If the objectives of enhancements in the didactics of undergraduate research and inquiry-
based learning are to be achieved, the responsible players need to obtain more profound 
insights into the complexity of the learning situation as a moment within an ambiguous 
enculturation and scientification process. The modelling introduced here is more than a 
means to some systematic understanding. It should also be taken as a basis to detect the 
concrete potentials and impairments of the particular development of becoming a 
researcher. It is societally and individually important that this becoming is not one-
dimensional (a mere form of functioning in the organisation). The countless learning 
processes of becoming a researcher are ultimately the ways in which the different sciences 
are reproduced. And this responsibility should not be reduced to the use of models for 
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